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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of audit committee characteristics on corporate voluntary disclosure of 
146 Malaysian listed firms for the year 2009. Based on content analysis of disclosure, the empirical results of multiple 
regressions reveal that audit committee independence, size and multiple directorships of audit committee members are 
positively associated with corporate voluntary disclosure. Frequency of meetings and financial expertise of audit committee 
members are not significantly associated with corporate voluntary disclosure. The results offer evidence to policy makers, 
investors and accounting professionals on the extent to which audit committee characteristics associated with such committee 
effectiveness in monitoring corporate reporting processes. 
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1. Introduction  
Audit committee (AC) is considered as one of the crucial and influential participants of corporate governance as 
it assists the board of directors in discharging its responsibilities in overseeing corporate management (Bedard & 
Gendron, 2010; Li, Mangena, & Pike, 2012). In this respect, it is argued that AC plays a key role in monitoring 
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management disclosure practices’ and internal control (Dhaliwal, Naiker & Navissi, 2010; Persons, 2009). Hence, 
effective AC results in the enhancement of financial reporting process and thus reducing information asymmetry 
between management and stakeholders (Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Li et al., 2012). Accordingly, AC maintains and 
enhances public confidence in the credibility and the objectivity of the financial reporting through improving the 
disclosure practices of published information (Bedard & Gendron, 2010; Kelton & Yang, 2008).  
Corporate voluntary disclosure is regarded as a mechanism to reduce information asymmetry between firm and 
outside investors (Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010; Jiang, Habib, & Hu, 2011), and hence lowers agency costs which 
leads to improve corporate reporting transparency (Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010). Furthermore, it is believed that 
transparency and adequate disclosure are also important in order to ensure the protection of minority shareholder’s 
rights (Jiang et al., 2011). This is because voluntary disclosure expresses the transparency and accountability of 
management in conducting business (Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010; Li et al., 2012).  
Prior studies, including Malaysian ones, on the association between corporate governance and corporate 
voluntary disclosure have mainly focused on board and ownership structure (Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010; 
Allegrini & Greco, 2011; Barako, Hancock, & Izan, 2006; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Mohd 
Ghazali & Weetman, 2006). In addition, a number of empirical studies has shown that AC characteristics influence 
financial reporting quality and disclosure practices in Malaysian companies (Abdullah, Mohamad-Yusof, & 
Mohamad-Nor, 2010; Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010). However, there are still limited empirical studies examining 
the role of AC in enhancing corporate voluntary disclosure. In this context, Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010) and 
Bedard and Gendron (2010) have suggested that an effective AC is needed to support a more transparent 
disclosure. Therefore, the aim of this study is to investigate the association between AC characteristics and 
corporate voluntary disclosure of Malaysian listed firms. This study has special significance in the context of 
Malaysia because of ownership concentration structure which makes Malaysia a unique corporate governance 
environment. Moreover, there is a lack of research in this field in Malaysia (Mohd Ghazali & Weetman, 2006).  
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1. Audit committee characteristics 
AC is an oversight committee under the main board of directors. The board of directors has delegated the 
responsibility of corporate reporting process to the AC (Bedard & Gendron, 2010; Li et al., 2012). The Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance (2007) views ACs as the ultimate monitor of the corporate reporting process. 
Thus, AC is regarded as the monitoring device that reduces information asymmetry (Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010; 
Barako et al., 2006), and consequently mitigates agency costs (Bedard & Gendron, 2010). Akhtaruddin and Haron 
(2010) and Barako et al., (2006) have indicated that AC is considered as a means of monitoring and improving 
corporate disclosure processes including voluntary disclosure. 
Literature on AC has suggested that AC effectiveness essentially functions on AC characteristics (Akhtaruddin 
& Haron, 2010; Bedard & Gendron, 2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Li et al., 2012; Persons, 2009). Hence, the right 
combination of skills and experience are critical in supporting the AC’s ability to carry out its responsibilities 
effectively. Therefore, hypotheses are developed to investigate the effect of AC characteristics (independence, 
financial expertise, size, frequency of meetings and directorship of AC members) on corporate voluntary 
disclosure. 
2.1.2 AC independence 
Based on agency theory, Fama and Jensen (1983) have argued that the effective monitoring of management’s 
behavior is more likely to be influenced by the presence of independent directors. This is because the independent 
directors on AC have no economic or personal relationship with management and hence they are more likely to 
work independently and objectively from management influence (Bedard & Gendron, 2010). Therefore, 
independent directors on AC have more opportunity to control and reduce management’s opportunities to withhold 
information for their own benefits (Allegrini & Greco, 2011). Hence, an AC with independent directors will insure 





the quality and transparency of financial reporting process, and which in turn reduces information asymmetry 
(Allegrini & Greco, 2011; Li et al., 2012). It therefore appears reasonable to argue that effective monitoring by 
independent directors on AC is thought to further motivate management to provide accurate and additional 
information in quick information processing (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010) and 
Patelli and Prencipe (2007) have found that AC independence is associated with more voluntary disclosure. It is 
therefore hypothesized that; H1: There is a positive association between the level of voluntary disclosure and AC 
independence.  
2.1.3 AC financial expertise  
In order to effectively monitor corporate reporting process, AC members should be financially literate, so that 
they are able to understand and interpret financial statements (Dhaliwal et al., 2010). Financial expertise leads AC 
members to identify and ask knowledgeable questions that challenge management and external audit to a greater 
extent of financial reporting quality (Bedard & Gendron, 2010). This in turn will enhance transparency of 
corporate reporting and hence mitigate agency problem associated with flow of information. Previous studies have 
found a positive relation between AC financial expertise and financial reporting quality (Kelton & Yang, 2008; 
Kent, Routledge, & Stewart, 2010), and level of voluntary disclosure (Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010).Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is tested; H2:There is a positive relationship between the level of voluntary disclosure and AC 
financial expertise. 
2.1.4 AC  meeting frequency 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) have argued that AC that meets more frequently is more likely to effectively 
accomplish its monitoring role. Greco (2011) has argued that meeting frequency of AC would allow the members 
to express judgment about the firm’s accounting choice of principles, disclosures and estimates. In this case, 
regular meetings of AC would make it informed and acknowledgeable about relevant accounting and auditing 
issues (Allegrini & Greco, 2011). For this reason, a more active AC, i.e. one that meets frequently during the year, 
would provide its members with greater opportunities for discussing and evaluating the issues placed before them 
concerning the company’s financial reporting practices (Li et al., 2012). Empirically, Allegrini and Greco (2011) 
and Li et al., (2012) have found that at least four meetings a year for AC members are significantly related to the 
level of voluntary disclosure and intellectual capital disclosure, respectively. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
indicated; H3: There is a positive relationship between the level of voluntary disclosure and frequency of AC 
meeting. 
2.1.5 AC size 
Resource dependency theory argues that larger ACs are willing to devote greater resources and authority to 
effectively carry out their responsibilities (Allegrini & Greco, 2011). More directors on AC are more likely to 
bring diversity of views, expertise, experiences and skills to ensure effective monitoring (Bedard & Gendron, 
2010). Hence, a higher number of AC members is likely to help such committee to uncover and resolve potential 
issues in corporate reporting process (Li et al., 2012). This indicates that, AC size is an integral factor for AC to 
adequately oversee corporate disclosure practices (Persons, 2009). Persons (2009) has found empirical evidence 
that many directors on AC appear to enhance the level of voluntary disclosure. Therefore, the following hypothesis 
is stated that; H4: There is a positive relationship between the level of voluntary disclosure and AC size.  
2.1.6 Multiple directorships of AC members  
Fama and Jensen (1983) have argued that outside directors with directorships are perceived to be valuable 
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because they are concerned about their reputation damage, litigation risks and possible loss of future board 
opportunities and therefore will be motivated to perform their monitoring role effectively. Multiple directorships 
provide directors with important information regarding new policies, trade and practices among firms that could 
lead to better performance (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). In addition, they expose directors to different management 
styles and monitoring behavior and allow directors to seek advice from others (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). For this 
context, it can be argued that for a director of AC who is attached to different firms as a board member, manager, 
or any committee member might gain additional contextual background for conducting their monitoring 
responsibilities and this may affect financial reporting outcomes. Consistently, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) have 
reported that multiple directorships of AC members enhance the corporate disclosure practices. Therefore, the 
following hypotheses is tested; H5: There is a positive relationship between the level of voluntary disclosure and 
directors with multiple directorships on AC  
3. Research design 
3.1. Sample selection  
Data for this study were collected from the annual reports of companies that were listed on Bursa Malaysia as at 
the end of 2009. As on December 31, 2009, there were 964 listed on Bursa Malaysia. After removing finance firms 
and firms with incomplete data, the final population was 500. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) the 146 
top market capitalizations were identified as appropriate sample for the population. The annual reports of sample 
companies for the financial year 2009 were downloaded from the Bursa Malaysia website. 
3.2. Voluntary disclosure measure  
This study applies the 86 voluntary disclosure item checklist developed by Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010) and 
Mohd Ghazali and Weetman (2006). This checklist consists of (28 items) strategic information, (18 items) non-
financial information and (40 items) financial information. A company is awarded 1 if an item included in the 
disclosure checklist is disclosed and 0 if it is not disclosed. Finally, the total score is divided by 86 to get voluntary 
disclosure score.  
3.3. Model 
Multiple regression analysis is employed to examine the relationship between corporate voluntary disclosure 
and the AC characteristics and control variables. Multiple regression assumptions including normality, 
multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity were met. The following regression model is estimated for this study:  
 
VDSCORE = β0 + β1ACIND + β2ACFEXP + β3ACMET + β4ACSIZ + β5MDAC + β6FSIZ + β7ROA + 
β8LEVERG + ε 
 
Where VDSCORE is sum of all disclosure scores awarded to the company divided by maximum possible 
potential score applicable to the company, ACIND is the proportion of independent directors on the audit 
committee to the total audit, ACFEXP is the proportion of financial expertise on the audit committee to the total 
audit members, ACMET is the number of audit committee meetings for the year, ACSIZ is total number of 
directors on the audit, MDAC is the proportion of directors on audit committee with at least one directorship in 
other firms to the total audit committee members, FSIZ is natural log of total assets, ROA is defined as net income 
after tax divided by total assets, and LEVERG is ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 





4. Empirical results  
4.1. Descriptive analysis  
Panel A of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of corporate voluntary disclosure for the overall index and 
categories. The mean disclosure score for overall items is 58.91% (ranging 45.35% to 79.07%). As for categories 
of voluntary disclosure, firms appear to voluntary disclose more strategic information at 75.29% than both 
financial information and non-financial information at 52.65% and 47.33%, respectively.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables  
 Mean Min Max SD 
Panel A- dependent variables      
Overall voluntary disclosure 58.91 45.35 79.07 8.18 
Strategic information 75.29 53.57 1.00 8.73 
Non-financial information 47.33 16.67 1.00 16.76 
Financial information  52.65 32.50 80.00 8.90 
Panel B –independent variables     
Audit committee independence  0.84 0.42 1.00 0.16 
Audit committee financial expertise  0.56 0.16 1.00 0.23 
Frequency meeting of audit committee  5.10 3.00 15.00 1.57 
Audit committee size  3.38 2.00 6.00 0.65 
Multiple directorships of audit committee 
members 
0.38 0.00 1.00 0.28 
Firm size 14.62 11.96 18.80 1.16 
Profitability 0.07 -0.20 0.52 0.08 
Leverage  0.22 0.00 0.71 0.17 
 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the independent variables. The mean proportion of 
independent AC members is 84%, indicating majority of firms are composed ACs with independent directors. The 
mean of AC directors with financial expertise is 56%. On average, frequency of meetings of AC members is 5. The 
results show that AC size is ranging from two to six members with mean of approximately 3 members. The results 
also show that 38% of the ACs in the sample firms have members with at least one directorship in other firms. In 
terms of control variables, the mean size of the firm is 14.62 and the average profitability is 7%, whilst the average 
leverage is 22%. 
4.2. Multiple regression results  
The regression results of the association between AC characteristics and voluntary disclosure are presented in 
Table 2. In respect to AC characteristics variables, the results show that AC independence (ACIND) is 
significantly and positively associated with corporate voluntary disclosure at the 5%. Thus, the H1 is supported. 
This is consistent with the findings from Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010) and Persons (2009) on voluntary 
disclosure. This finding is in the line with the notion that independent directors on AC enhance AC effectiveness. 
In this respect, it can be argued that AC independence effectively monitors and oversees the information disclosed 
in the annual reports and hence enhances voluntary discourse. 
 
Table 2. Multiple regression results  
Variable  Coefficient t-test P-value 
(Constant)   0.336 0.737 
ACIND 0.147 2.121 0.036** 
ACFEXP 0.081 1.090 0.277 
ACMET -0.021 -0.289 0.773 
ACSIZ 0.188 2.680 0.008*** 
MDAC 0.194 2.628 0.010** 
FSIZ 0.448 5.121 0.000*** 




ROA 0.262 3.395 0.001*** 
LEVRG -0.038 -0.540 0.590 
R2 0.384 
Adjusted R2 0.348 
F 10.686 
Sig. .000 
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5% 
 
AC with financial expertise directors is insignificantly associated with voluntary disclosure, thus hypothesis H2 
is not supported. This result supports Persons’s (2009) finding indicating insignificant association with corporate 
voluntary disclosure. However, the results do not support the prior studies reporting a positive association with 
financial reporting quality (Kent et al., 2010), and corporate voluntary disclosure (Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010). It 
may well be that the corporate disclosure practices might require domain knowledge of accounting, auditing and 
finance to effectively evaluate and assess disclosed information. 
The frequency of meetings of AC members is not significantly associated with corporate voluntary disclosure, 
thus H3 is not supported. This indicates that AC activity does not enhance monitoring role of such committee over 
corporate disclosure practices. 
AC size is positively and significantly associated with corporate voluntary disclosure at the level of 1%. 
Therefore, hypothesis H4 is supported. This is consistent with the previous studies that have found AC size to be 
associated with financial reporting quality (Dhaliwal et al., 2010) and increased level of voluntary disclosure 
(Persons, 2009). The result suggests that AC size is an important factor in enhancing corporate voluntary 
disclosure in order to reduce information asymmetry associated with agency problems. 
Finally, the result for AC members with multiple directorships is positive and significant with corporate 
voluntary disclosure at 5%. Thus, hypothesis H5 is supported. The significant result, for AC members with 
multiple directorships, is consistent with (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Yang & Krishnan, 2005) and suggests that 
greater corporate voluntary disclosure is more likely when AC members hold directorships in other firms. This 
indicates that multiple directorships enhance AC’s efficiency in monitoring management disclosure practices and 
therefore the ability to effectively oversee corporate disclosure processes. 
In terms of the control variables, the statistical result shows that large companies have a significant influence on 
voluntary disclosure. The statistical result also shows that profitable firms enhance corporate voluntary disclosure. 
Finally, firm size shows an insignificant association with corporate voluntary disclosure.  
5. Conclusion 
This study examines the role of AC in enhancing corporate voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
Malaysian listed firms. Specifically, this paper investigates the association between AC characteristics and 
corporate voluntary disclosure. The empirical results indicate that AC independence, size and multiple 
directorships of AC members have significant effect on corporate voluntary disclosure. Financial expertise and 
frequency meeting of AC directors have no significant impact on corporate voluntary disclosure. Nevertheless, the 
results are consistent with the idea that AC plays a key role in overseeing corporate reporting processes including 
voluntary disclosure practices. The effectiveness of AC is contingent on AC characteristics namely, independency, 
size and multiple directorship of the committees’ members. In line with the vigorous initiatives to improve AC 
effectiveness in corporate reporting transparency, the study provides insights into the role of AC in overseeing 
corporate reporting processes. This study demonstrates that agency theory complements resources dependency 
theory in enhancing audit committee effectiveness. Findings of this study are of interest to investors, policy makers 
and accounting professionals as they provide a useful basis for assessing and enhancing AC characteristics being 
associated with such committee effectiveness, which is important to improve corporate disclosure practices. The 
findings also add to the existing literature by contributing to the understanding of the role of AC in corporate 
disclosure practices. However, all the results are based on Malaysian stock market, and hence there may be 
limitations in extending to other countries. Future research could examine other characteristics of AC such as 
gender and tenure of directors and nationality of directors. Interaction of AC characteristics could also be 
examined.  
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